From e3f65fc3d62aa3a5577c0a59e6417d056ff14c02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Goksu Ceylan <79890826+GoCeylan@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2026 03:20:35 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] fix(security): block critical symlink workspace escape (#188)

---
 pkg/tools/filesystem.go      | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 pkg/tools/filesystem_test.go | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/pkg/tools/filesystem.go b/pkg/tools/filesystem.go
index 2376877..09063ea 100644
--- a/pkg/tools/filesystem.go
+++ b/pkg/tools/filesystem.go
@@ -29,13 +29,54 @@ func validatePath(path, workspace string, restrict bool) (string, error) {
 		}
 	}
 
-	if restrict && !strings.HasPrefix(absPath, absWorkspace) {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("access denied: path is outside the workspace")
+	if restrict {
+		if !isWithinWorkspace(absPath, absWorkspace) {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("access denied: path is outside the workspace")
+		}
+
+		workspaceReal := absWorkspace
+		if resolved, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(absWorkspace); err == nil {
+			workspaceReal = resolved
+		}
+
+		if resolved, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(absPath); err == nil {
+			if !isWithinWorkspace(resolved, workspaceReal) {
+				return "", fmt.Errorf("access denied: symlink resolves outside workspace")
+			}
+		} else if os.IsNotExist(err) {
+			if parentResolved, err := resolveExistingAncestor(filepath.Dir(absPath)); err == nil {
+				if !isWithinWorkspace(parentResolved, workspaceReal) {
+					return "", fmt.Errorf("access denied: symlink resolves outside workspace")
+				}
+			} else if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+				return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve path: %w", err)
+			}
+		} else {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve path: %w", err)
+		}
 	}
 
 	return absPath, nil
 }
 
+func resolveExistingAncestor(path string) (string, error) {
+	for current := filepath.Clean(path); ; current = filepath.Dir(current) {
+		if resolved, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(current); err == nil {
+			return resolved, nil
+		} else if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+			return "", err
+		}
+		if filepath.Dir(current) == current {
+			return "", os.ErrNotExist
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func isWithinWorkspace(candidate, workspace string) bool {
+	rel, err := filepath.Rel(filepath.Clean(workspace), filepath.Clean(candidate))
+	return err == nil && rel != ".." && !strings.HasPrefix(rel, ".."+string(os.PathSeparator))
+}
+
 type ReadFileTool struct {
 	workspace string
 	restrict  bool
diff --git a/pkg/tools/filesystem_test.go b/pkg/tools/filesystem_test.go
index 2707f29..9580364 100644
--- a/pkg/tools/filesystem_test.go
+++ b/pkg/tools/filesystem_test.go
@@ -247,3 +247,35 @@ func TestFilesystemTool_ListDir_DefaultPath(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("Expected success with default path '.', got IsError=true: %s", result.ForLLM)
 	}
 }
+
+// Block paths that look inside workspace but point outside via symlink.
+func TestFilesystemTool_ReadFile_RejectsSymlinkEscape(t *testing.T) {
+
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	workspace := filepath.Join(root, "workspace")
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(workspace, 0755); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to create workspace: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	secret := filepath.Join(root, "secret.txt")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(secret, []byte("top secret"), 0644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to write secret file: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	link := filepath.Join(workspace, "leak.txt")
+	if err := os.Symlink(secret, link); err != nil {
+		t.Skipf("symlink not supported in this environment: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	tool := NewReadFileTool(workspace, true)
+	result := tool.Execute(context.Background(), map[string]interface{}{
+		"path": link,
+	})
+
+	if !result.IsError {
+		t.Fatalf("expected symlink escape to be blocked")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, "symlink resolves outside workspace") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected symlink escape error, got: %s", result.ForLLM)
+	}
+}