Merge pull request #128 from yinwm/feat/better-version
feat: add git commit hash to version and improve documentation
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92
README.md
92
README.md
@@ -425,6 +425,98 @@ PicoClaw stores data in your configured workspace (default: `~/.picoclaw/workspa
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└── USER.md # User preferences
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```
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### 🔒 Security Sandbox
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PicoClaw runs in a sandboxed environment by default. The agent can only access files and execute commands within the configured workspace.
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#### Default Configuration
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```json
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{
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"agents": {
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"defaults": {
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"workspace": "~/.picoclaw/workspace",
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"restrict_to_workspace": true
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}
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}
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}
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```
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| Option | Default | Description |
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|--------|---------|-------------|
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| `workspace` | `~/.picoclaw/workspace` | Working directory for the agent |
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| `restrict_to_workspace` | `true` | Restrict file/command access to workspace |
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#### Protected Tools
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When `restrict_to_workspace: true`, the following tools are sandboxed:
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| Tool | Function | Restriction |
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|------|----------|-------------|
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| `read_file` | Read files | Only files within workspace |
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| `write_file` | Write files | Only files within workspace |
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| `list_dir` | List directories | Only directories within workspace |
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| `edit_file` | Edit files | Only files within workspace |
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| `append_file` | Append to files | Only files within workspace |
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| `exec` | Execute commands | Command paths must be within workspace |
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#### Additional Exec Protection
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Even with `restrict_to_workspace: false`, the `exec` tool blocks these dangerous commands:
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- `rm -rf`, `del /f`, `rmdir /s` — Bulk deletion
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- `format`, `mkfs`, `diskpart` — Disk formatting
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- `dd if=` — Disk imaging
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- Writing to `/dev/sd[a-z]` — Direct disk writes
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- `shutdown`, `reboot`, `poweroff` — System shutdown
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- Fork bomb `:(){ :|:& };:`
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#### Error Examples
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```
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[ERROR] tool: Tool execution failed
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{tool=exec, error=Command blocked by safety guard (path outside working dir)}
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```
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```
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[ERROR] tool: Tool execution failed
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{tool=exec, error=Command blocked by safety guard (dangerous pattern detected)}
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```
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#### Disabling Restrictions (Security Risk)
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If you need the agent to access paths outside the workspace:
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**Method 1: Config file**
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```json
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{
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"agents": {
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"defaults": {
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"restrict_to_workspace": false
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}
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}
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}
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```
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**Method 2: Environment variable**
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```bash
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export PICOCLAW_AGENTS_DEFAULTS_RESTRICT_TO_WORKSPACE=false
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```
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> ⚠️ **Warning**: Disabling this restriction allows the agent to access any path on your system. Use with caution in controlled environments only.
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#### Security Boundary Consistency
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The `restrict_to_workspace` setting applies consistently across all execution paths:
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| Execution Path | Security Boundary |
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|----------------|-------------------|
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| Main Agent | `restrict_to_workspace` ✅ |
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| Subagent / Spawn | Inherits same restriction ✅ |
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| Heartbeat tasks | Inherits same restriction ✅ |
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All paths share the same workspace restriction — there's no way to bypass the security boundary through subagents or scheduled tasks.
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### Heartbeat (Periodic Tasks)
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PicoClaw can perform periodic tasks automatically. Create a `HEARTBEAT.md` file in your workspace:
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